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HOW MUCH ANGUISH IS ENOUGH? BABY SWITCHING
AND NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Marc D. Ginsberg*
I. HYPOTHETICAL
Two mothers, A and B, deliver children, X and Y, at the same hospi-
tal on the same day. Both children are taken to the newborn nursery. Due
to misidentification, the babies are switched. X is given to B, Y is given to
A, and the mothers nurse each other's babies in the hospital. The mistake
is corrected in the hospital after a few days (or, alternatively, after the
mothers take the wrong babies home). X is returned to A, Y is returned to
B. The mothers, however, are not comforted and request blood and DNA
testing for health and maternity confirmation. Within a couple of weeks, it
is confirmed that the mothers have the correct babies and that the babies
are healthy. One of the mothers suffers depression and anxiety. She re-
mains concerned about the safety of her child and continually recalls the
traumatic hospital experience.
Does the mother have a potential negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim against hospital?
II. INTRODUCTION
The misidentification of newborns in a hospital is regrettable and
well-known to the medical literature.' It has been estimated that 20,000 ac-
cidental baby switches occur each year due to various errors in identifica-
tion.2 There is a known pregnancy anxiety related to potential baby switch-
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1. See, e.g., James E. Gray et al., Pediatric Misidentification in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit: Quanti-
fication of Risk, 117 PEDIATRICS e43 (2006); Gautham Suresh et al., Voluntary Anonymous Reporting of
Medical Errors For Neonatal Intensive Care, 113 PEDIATRICS 1609, 1612-14 (2004); Robert R. Rusting,
Baby Switching: An Underreported Problem That Needs to Be Recognized, 17 J. HEALTHCARE PROT.
MGMT. 89, 89, 97, 99 (2001).
2. Rusting, supra note 1, at 99 (noting that the errors largely relate to the failure to check the baby's ID.
band with the mother's and that babies are temporarily taken from their bassinets and returned to the wrong
ones). It defies logic, however, to suggest that most of these switches are anything other than very brief in
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ing.' It is also urged, however, that misidentification occurs despite the
best efforts of the hospital:
[W]hen the wrong mother is identified today, it is almost always
despite diligent efforts to make a correct identification. The
hospital takes a footprint of the baby, places a wristband on the
mother and the baby, provides twenty-four hour video monitor-
ing of the nursery, and utilizes other steps to assure that each
woman is uniquely identified to only her own child.'
Misidentification of newborns is a well-reported occurrence in neona-
tal intensive care units.'
Another more fundamental consequence of newborn misidentifica-
tion in a hospital is baby switching, giving a newborn to the wrong mother,
perhaps being nursed by the wrong mother in the hospital and taken home
by the wrong family.' The family law complications of baby switching are
numerous and are the subject of scholarly discussion.'
Tort claims may arise from baby switching in a hospital. The likely
claim is one for infliction of emotional distress' brought by the mother of
the switched baby against the hospital. This commentary explores (1) the
emotional distress claim as it implicates duties owed by a hospital to its
patients and parents of patients, and (2) how much distress must be suf-
fered in order to support the claim.
nature.
3. Joan DiPasquale Davis et al., Pregnancy-Anxieties and Natural Recognition in Baby-Switching, 10 Brit.
J. Nursing 718 (2001).
4. Ronald K. Henry, The Innocent Third Party: Victims Of Paternity Fraud, 40 Fam. L. Q. 51, 74 (2006).
5. See Gray et al., supra note 1; Suresh et al., supra note 1, at 1612-14; C. Snijders, et al., Incidents and
Errors in Neonatal Intensive Care: A Review Of The Literature, 92 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD,
FETAL & NEONATAL EDITION 391 (2007).
6. See, e.g., Filson v. Seton Corp., 2009 WL 196048, at *1, *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2009) (baby nursed
by wrong mother); Larson v. Banner Health System, 81 P.3d 196, 198-99 (Wyo. 2003) (baby taken home
by the wrong family).
7. See Cynthia R. Mabry, The Tragic and Chaotic Aftermath of A Baby Switch: Should Policy And Com-
mon Law, Blood Ties, Or Psychological Bonds Prevail?, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1 (1999); Kath-
eryn Katz, Ghost Mothers: Human EffDonation And The Legacy Of The Past, 57 ALB. L. REV. 733 (1994).
Tara R. Crane, Mistaken Baby Switches, Analysis of Hospital Liability and Resulting Custody Issues, 21 J.
LEGAL MED. 109, 109-111, 116, 118 (2000); Jana Micek, The Child's Right ofAccess to the Courts, 11 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 656, 658-60 (2000); Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Switched At The Fertility Clinic:
Determining Maternal Rights When A Child Is Born From Stolen Or Misdelivered Genetic Material, 64
Mo. L. REV. 517, 519-521, 553-559, 594 (1999); Henry, supra note 3, at 58-60; Christi Gill Baunach, The
Role Of Equitable Adoption In A Mistaken Baby Switch-31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 501, 501-13 (1992);
Janet Leach Richards, Redefining Parenthood: Parental Rights Versus Child Rights, 40 WAYNE L. REV.
1227, 1230-33 (1994); Joy McMillen, Begging The Wisdom of Solomon: Hiding Behind The Issue of Stand-
ing In Custody Disputes To Treat Children As Chattel Without Regard For Their Best Interests,_39 ST.
LOUis U. L.J. 699, 699, 701-706 (1995); Leslie Bender, Genes, Parents, and Assisted Reproductive Tech-
nologies: Arts, Mistakes, Sex, Race, & Law, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 2-7, 20-24 (2003).
8. See generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, HORNBOOK SERIES, 821-22 (West Group 2000).
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III. WHAT DUTY IS OWED BY A HOSPITAL TO ITS PATIENT?
A hospital is an owner/occupier of land which owes tort duties to
those on its premises, including patients. A hospital patient may hold the
status of a business invitee.' The general duty of care to the invitee has
been defined as "a duty of care to make conditions on the land reasonably
safe and to conduct its active operations with reasonable care for the in-
vitee whose presence is known or reasonably foreseeable.""o More specifi-
cally related to the hospital/patient setting, "the duty a hospital owes its pa-
tients is to exercise reasonable or ordinary care to maintain, in a
reasonably safe condition, that part of the hospital designed for the pa-
tients' use."" More recently, it has been urged that the hospital/patient re-
lationship implicates a hospital's fiduciary responsibilities.12
A hospital's duty to its patients may be cast more in terms of a pro-
fessional negligence duty. A hospital owes a "general duty of care toward
a patient" and a "duty to exercise reasonable care in rendering hospital
services."l4 Similarly, a hospital is liable to its patients for failing to have
in place procedures to protect patients" and owes a professional duty to
provide a safe environment for patient diagnosis, treatment, and recov-
ery.'6
Whichever approach is preferred, the hospital should be required to
safe keep newborns on its premises. Whether a hospital owes a duty to
parents of newborns is somewhat more difficult (and interesting) to ana-
lyze. Of course, a predicate duty to parents of newborns is necessary to a
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim based on baby switching.
IV. WHAT DUTY IS OWED BY A HOSPITAL TO THE PARENTS
OF A NEWBORN?
Can baby switching provide the ammunition for a negligent infliction
of emotional distress (NIED) claim in favor of a parent? All negligence
claims require a breach of duty." If a hospital owes a tort duty to a parent,
9. See, e.g., Riverview Reg. Med. Ctr. v. Williams, 667 So. 2d 46, 48 (Ala. 1995); Bodin v. Vagshenian,
462 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2006).
10. DOBBS, supra note 8, at 602.
11. Thornton v. F.J. Cherry Hospital, 644 S.E.2d 369 (2007), affd, 655 S.E.2d 350 (2008).
12. Barry R. Furrow, Patient Safety and the Fiduciary Hospital: Sharepening Judicial Remedies, t Drexel
L. Rev. 439,482-84 (2009).
13. McSwane v. Bloomington Hosp. & Healthcare Sys., 882 N.E.2d 244, 249-53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
14. Id
15. Barry R. Furrow, et. al., Health Law, Hornbook Series 381 (West Publishing Co. 2d ed. 2000).
16. Id. at 382.
17. DOBBS, supra note 8, at 269.
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upon what is that duty based? The parent, in a traditional sense, is not the
patient against whom the negligence is visited. The baby is the direct vic-
tim.II
NIED claims historically come in two varieties, dependent upon the
victim: direct victim claims and bystander claims." The parent, as plaintiff
in a baby switching-based NIED claim, is arguably not the "direct" victim
of the tortfeasor.20 The parent has not suffered direct physical harm or
physical impact. Although the parent's NIED claim may not fit perfectly
with the stand-alone or bystander claim category, it is likely that the by-
stander category of claim potentially applies.2 1
The "fit" of the label (direct vs. bystander) to the baby-switching
NIED claim is worthy of mention because the traditional analysis can be a
bit uncomfortable. Here, the parent (plaintiff) clearly does not suffer a
physical impact or bodily injury and would be disqualified from a direct
victim claim. 22 However, the parent of a switched baby does not classically
observe a tort visited on the baby, does not come to an accident scene to
witness an injured child and, depending on when the switch is corrected,
cannot know if the baby was harmed in any respect. This could be signifi-
cant in determining if a parent has a cognizable NIED claim.
Back to the tort "duty" inquiry: bystander NIED analysis requires at-
tention to "foreseeability" of emotional harm as the basis of a duty owed to
the bystander NIED claimant. Courts have struggled with foreseeability as
the sole determinant of duty in the NIED context and have relied upon pol-
icy considerations to define the claim. 23 The reason for this has been ex-
18. See Johnson v. Jamaica Hosp., 467 N.E. 2d 502, 503, 524-25, 527-29, 531-32 (N.Y. 1984) (court rec-
ognized that direct injury was inflicted upon plaintiffs daughter, who was abducted from the hospital due
to the hospital's breach of its duty of care owed to the daughter).
19. See Dan B. Dobbs, Undertaking and Special Relationships In Claims For Negligent Infliction Of Emo-
tional Distress, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 49, 51 (2008) ("[C]ourts firmly accept recovery for negligently inflicted
emotional distress as damages parasitic to physical harm, that is, as a form of pain and suffering. However,
negligently inflicted stand-alone emotional distress is a different matter. Stand-alone claims for emotional
distress do not assert that the distress resulted from physical harm or bodily impact").
20. Johnson, 467 N.E. 2d at 503.
21. Of course, the mother of a switched baby may physically bond with the wrong baby. The mother may
hold and nurse the wrong baby, which clearly involves a physical touching.
22. See Johnson, 467 N.E. 2d at 530-32. Here, the Court of Appeals of New York held that the parents of
a newborn infant abducted from the defendant hospital's nursery could not recover damages from the hos-
pital for the parents' emotional distress secondary to hospital negligence in the case of the child or in the
management of its nursery. Id. The Court found no direct duty owed by the hospital to the parents. Id
The Court rejected an "in loco parentis" based duty owed to the parents. Id. at 528-29. The Court, in ana-
lyzing the pleadings, noted that the parents did not allege "that they were within the zone of danger and that
their injuries resulted from contemporaneous observation or serious physical injury or death caused by de-
fendant's negligence." Id. at 526. It seems as if the Court in Johnson considered two separate bases for the
potential claim - direct tort duty owed to parents and a "zone of danger" formula - and rejected them both.
Id.
23. See, e.g., Thing v. LaChusa, 771 P.2d 814, 818-19 (Cal. 1989).
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plained eloquently by the Supreme Court of California in Thing v.
LaChusa. 24 That Court concluded that the use of foreseeability alone to
define duty creates a limitless class of potential claimants. It noted that
"foreseeability, like light, travels indefinitely in a vacuum" 25 and "that
foreseeability of injury alone is not a useful 'guideline' or a meaningful
restriction on the scope of the NIED action." 26 As a result, courts are apt
to look to policy factors to limit the scope of bystander NIED claims, such
as:
-Was the direct victim severely injured or killed? 27
-Is the NIED bystander claimant closely related to the direct
victim? 28
-Did the NIED bystander claimant observe the tortious act or
observe the scene or aftermath shortly after the tort occurred? 29
-Did the NIED bystander claimant suffer the appropriate type
and amount of distress? 3o
With this background, the introductory hypothetical can be re-
examined and case law explored to determine how courts tend to confront
NIED baby switching cases and the evidence of emotional harm.
V. CASE LAW
There is a modest but interesting body of law in baby switching cases
involving emotional distress claims." The facts of the cases vary widely.
These cases will be examined for factual content and to determine if there
is any common thread to the courts' legal analysis in resolving the emo-
tional distress claims.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 824.
26. Id.
27. Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W. 2d 432, 439, 444-446 (Wis. 1994).
28. Thing, 771 P.2d at 815; Groves v. Taylor, 729 N.E.2d 569, 573 (Ind. 2000).
29. Bowen, 517 N.W.2d at 444-445.
30. See id. at 445-46.
31. Filson, 2009 WL 196048, at *4; Larson, 81 P.3d at 199; Lopez v. Corp. Insular De Seguro, 931 F.2d
116, 124 (1st Cir. 1991); Twigg v. Hosp. Dist. of Hardee County, 731 F. Supp. 469, 472 (M.D. Fla. 1990);
Mays v. Twigg, 543 So. 2d 241, 242-43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Wishard Mem'1 Hosp. v. Logwood, 512
N.E.2d 1126, 1126-28 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); Ryan v. U.S., 2007 WL 557193, at *1 (D. ND. 2007), af'd,
534 F.3d 828 (8th Cir. 2008); Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 249 P.2d 843 (Cal Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
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A. Filson v. Seton Corp."
On August 15, 2003, the Filsons' and Hobbs' babies were born at
Baptist Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee. Two days later, the Hobbs' baby
was mistakenly delivered to Ms. Filson to be nursed. The baby did not
nurse well and Ms. Filson then realized that the baby did not look like
hers. Ms. Filson compared her armband number with the baby's armband
number to find that the numbers did not match. Ms. Filson knew that the
baby was not hers.
Ms. Filson and her husband went to the nursery, saw that her baby's
bassinet was empty and waited for the nurses to check the other bassinets.
The Filsons' baby was found in a bassinet labeled "Hobbs." The baby's
ankle I.D. bracelet was missing but she was wearing a wrist I.D. bracelet
and security bracelet. After further investigation, Ms. Filson and the hospi-
tal nurses knew that Ms. Filson breast fed the wrong baby.
After the baby switching incident, blood and DNA testing ensued.
The DNA testing confirmed that Ms. Filson departed the hospital with her
biological child.
The Filsons sued Baptist Hospital alleging hospital negligence result-
ing in the baby switch and Ms. Filson nursing the wrong baby. They
claimed pain, suffering and emotional distress. The Filsons did not seek
professional assistance for their alleged injuries. Neither a physician nor
psychologist stated that the Filsons suffered "serious" mental injury due to
the events.
Procedurally, the defendant hospital filed a motion for summary
judgment to which the Filsons responded. The motion for summary judg-
ment raised the issues of the absence of expert testimony and the insuffi-
ciency of the claimed emotional injuries to support the emotional distress
claim.
Interestingly, the Filsons filed an affidavit of a psychiatrist who did
not render any care to Ms. Filson prior to filing suit. In fact, he evaluated
her for an hour and a half, only two days before his affidavit was filed. The
psychiatrist opined that Ms. Filson "suffers or suffered from the serious
emotional/psychiatric condition of dysthymia."33 He defined "'dysthymia'
as a 'chronic low-grade depressive syndrome."' 34 Ms. Filson's affidavit
described her "immediate reaction to the incident and the ten days await-
32. Filson, 2009 WL 196048, at *1-11; Hobbs v. Seton Corp., 2009 WL 196040, at *1-5 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Jan. 27, 2009). In Hobbs, however, summary judgment was granted as the mother's emotional distress
claim. Id. That claim was not the subject of the appeal to the Court of Appeals of Tennessee.
33. Filson, 2009 WL 196048, at *2.
34. Id.
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ing the DNA test, e.g., sleep deprivation, depression, excessive crying.""
In addition, she described a loss of trust in professionals."
In ruling on the hospital's motion for summary judgment, the "court
found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the seriousness
of Ms. Filson's emotional injury"37 and refused to dispose of her entire
claim on the hospital's motion. Essentially, the trial court allowed the
emotional distress claim limited to the ten day time period between the
baby switching incident and the results of the DNA testing.
The Court of Appeals' opinion focused on the Tennessee law of neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress. The seminal Tennessee Supreme
Court case, Camper v. Minor, " made clear that the Supreme Court was:
fundamentally concerned with striking a balance between two
opposing objectives: first, promoting the underlying purpose of
negligence law - that of compensating persons who have sus-
tained emotional injuries attributable to the wrongful conduct of
others; and second, avoiding the trivial or fraudulent claims that
have been thought to be inevitable due to the subjective nature
of these injuries."
The Court of Appeals, therefore, "telegraphed" a policy concern for
courts of Tennessee - a flood of non-meritorious cases, 40 particularly in
"stand-alone"4 ' negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. Interest-
ingly, it did not identify baby switching cases as sui generis - the type of
claim so uncommon that it would not likely flood Tennessee courts. It
identified the Tennessee Supreme Court opinion in Camper v. Minor 42 as
the hallmark of Tennessee jurisprudence regarding claims for emotional
distress.
The Camper 43 rules require a serious or severe claimed emotional in-
jury' and support of the claimed injury by expert proof.45 The Filson
Court, citing Camper, noted that "a serious or severe emotional injury oc-
curs where a reasonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at *3.
38. Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W. 2d 437 (Tenn. 1996).
39. Id at 440.
40. Filson, 2009 WL 196048, at * 5.
41. Id.
42. Id. (quoting Camper, 915 S.W. 2d at 437).
43. Camper, 915 S.W. 2d at 446.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of
the case."46 The Tennessee Supreme Court, in Ramsey v. Beavers,4 7 further
pronounced that only a disabling emotional injury would be serious or se-
vere enough for recovery.
With this background and legal analysis, the Filson Court held that in
a stand-alone claim of NIED "the plaintiff must prove by medical expert
or scientific proof that the emotional injury is so onerous as to render a
reasonable person, normally constituted, unable to cope with the mental
stress caused by the negligence,"4 8 essentially a disabling emotional injury.
This analysis would potentially marginalize the trauma of baby switching
and look to the depth of emotional distress as part of the prima facie case,
not simply to the measure of damages.4 9
Ms. Filson's claim could not withstand scrutiny. A psychiatric
evaluation of Ms. Filson did not occur until after the litigation was in pro-
gress and not until after the hospital moved for summary judgment. Ms.
Filson's psychiatric evaluation occurred in one day. Apparently, she was
not otherwise under the care of a mental health professional. The affidavit
of the psychiatrist concluded that Ms. Filson suffered from "a chronic low-
grade depressive syndrome."so
Although Ms. Filson had reported to the psychiatrist her sadness, lack
of trust, decreased sleep, decreased enjoyment and decreased energy,"as
well as stating in her affidavit "the fear and uncertainty she experienced
while in the hospital during the ten days until the DNA reports confirmed
her child's identity,"52 the Filson Court held that there was an absence of
expert proof of a "debilitating emotional injury." Ms. Filson's "mild de-
pression"" was insufficient to support the NIED claim.
The Filson Court again paid homage to the Tennessee Supreme Court
and its quest to conquer potentially frivolous claims. Referring to the Su-
preme Court's opinion in Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Nashville,54
the Filson Court identified the Doe "directive"" from the Supreme Court:
"We express confidence in the court system to winnow out false and frivo-
lous claims through the pretrial and trial processes and through conscien-
46. Filson, 2009 WL 196048, at * 5 (quoting Camper, 915 S.W. 2d at 446).
47. Ramsey v. Beavers, 931 S.W. 2d 527, 532 (Tenn. 1996).
48. Filson, 2009 WL 196048 at *6 (quoting Flax v. Daimler Corp., 2008 WL 2831225, at *4).
49. DOBBS, supra note 8, at 1047-48.
50. Filson, 2009 WL 196048, at * 8.
51. Id. at *7-8.
52. Id. at *8.
53. Id
54. Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Nashville, 154 S.W. 3d 22 (Tenn. 2005).
55. Filson, 2009 WL 196048, at * 8.
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tious application of the elements necessary to establish causes of action for
purely emotional harm.", 6
The Filson Court's concern with frivolous NIED claims is unmistak-
able. The Filson Court also identified a rather high hurdle that Ms. Filson
could not clear - the need for expert proof of an emotional disability. The
circumstances of the baby switch did not carry the day. The court looked
to the depth and quality of Ms. Filson's emotional distress as a necessary
element of the claim and subjectively determined its insufficiency.
Of course, the Filson Court's concern may be exaggerated. Although
baby switching can occur, it is unlikely to occur in vast numbers due to
hospital security. The likely "universe" of NIED claims due to baby
switching is small. Is there another way for a court to approach an NIED
claim based on baby switching that recognizes the unique circumstances of
parents who experience it?
Perhaps the Filson Court could have considered the parents' experi-
ences and "trauma" associated with baby switching. Since courts have not
routinely considered baby switching, perhaps these cases are entitled to a
different legal analysis than one that primarily focuses on the flood of non-
meritorious claims. Why not evaluate the depth of claimed distress as a
damage element, similar to the analysis of damages in other personal in-
jury based tort claims?
Consider the rare event featured in Witt v. Yale-New Haven Hospi-
tal." Ms. Witt was a breast cancer patient who required chemotherapy.
Chemotherapy carries a likely risk of infertility; therefore, Ms. Witt al-
lowed the hospital to remove and cryogenically store her ovarian tissue
with the hope of a future pregnancy. There, the defendant hospital alleg-
edly "discarded Ms. Witt's ovarian tissue, which had been cryogenically
frozen and stored for the purposing [sic] of using the tissue to allow the
Witts to conceive a child in the future."" Among the claims were NIED
claims on behalf of both wife and husband. After learning that the tissue
had been discarded, Ms. Witt "suffered sleep disturbances, nightmares,
headaches, inability to concentrate, depression, post-traumatic stress dis-
order, severe and extreme emotional distress, [and] a diminished capacity
or loss to engage in and enjoy many of life's activities."" Ms. Witt's hus-
band "suffered severe and extreme emotional distress."o
56. Doe, 154 S.W.3d.
57. Witt v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 977 A.2d 779 (Conn. 2008).
58. Id. at 781-82.
59. Id. at 782.
60. Id.
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The Witt Court framed the issue as: "whether the anxiety or fear at-
tendant upon the loss of an opportunity to use anticipated future technol-
ogy to potentially conceive a child is sufficiently foreseeable to support a
claim of negligent inflection of emotional distress."6'
Using the foreseeability test and referring to other decisions concern-
ing "the deprivation of the opportunity of experiencing pregnancy, prena-
tal bonding, and the birth of a child,"62 the Witt court found "persuasive
support for the proposition that the anxiety created by the foreclosure of an
opportunity to potentially conceive a child is foreseeable."6 3
The Witt Court recognized the parents' "clear emotional investment
in the procedures recommended to them by the defendant, which would be
reasonably apparent to any ART [alternative reproductive technology]
provider"' and that ART providers are aware of "heightened emotional
distress that commonly attends these procedure and the special attachment
that parents typically maintain for this type of unique genetic material."65
Therefore, it was reasonable for defendants to foresee "overwhelming
anxiety sufficient to cause illness or bodily harm" 6 as a result of discard-
ing the ovarian tissue.
The Witt Court also referred to the wife and husband's shared reli-
ance on the ART practitioner.67 Both parents would "be equally distressed
to learn that their only hope for having a child together was discarded by
their medical provider."'
The Witt Court was concerned with limiting bystander NIED claims
but was confident that "the pool of potential litigants is inherently lim-
ited."" The ART related NIED claim "[did] not involve a secondary vic-
tim.""o "[T]here is a limited universe of potential claimants.""
The Filson Court, although perhaps constrained by Tennessee juris-
prudence,n could have applied a foreseeability test and considered the par-
61. Id. at 785.
62. Id. (quoting Perry-Rogers v. Obasaju, 723 N.Y.S. 2d 28, 29 (2001)).
63. Id. at 786. This finding is particularly interesting in light of the fact that as recently as 2006, The Prac-
tice Committee of the American Society for Reproduction medicine considered ovarian tissue cryopreser-
vation and transplantation as experimental. A detailed committee report is provided in Ovarian Tissue and
Oocyte Cryopreservation, 86 (Suppl. 4) Fertil. Steril. S142 (Nov. 2006).
64. Id. at 787.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 788.
67. Id. at 789-90.
68. Id. at 790.
69. Id. at 792.
70. Id
71. Id.
72. See Camper, 915 S.W. 2d at 440-43; Doe, 154 S.W. 3d at 22; Ramsey, 931 S.W. 2d at 529-32.
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ents' reliance upon a hospital to safe keep their newborn child. The reali-
zation of a missing child, if only for a relatively brief time, must be emo-
tionally painful. How much less foreseeable is the attendant distress from a
Filson-like baby switch than that arising from the Witt scenario?" Court
dockets are not filled with baby switching NIED claims. Perhaps the court
in Filson was too harsh and too dismissive of the claim, equating "frivol-
ity" with less than an emotionally disabling injury. If the Filson court
would have focused on foreseeable emotional harm instead of the need for
proof of emotional disability, Ms. Filson might have been able to prose-
cute her NIED claim, despite proof of modest damages.
B. Larsen v. Banner Health System74
In Larsen, the Supreme Court of Wyoming considered the following
certified question from the United States District Court for the District of
Wyoming: "Whether a mother and daughter, who were separated for forty-
three years because a hospital switched two newborn babies at birth, can
maintain a negligence action in which the only alleged damages are great
emotional pain, humiliation, anxiety, grief, and expenses for psychological
counseling?""
The baby switch occurred in 1958 - two babies went home with the
wrong mothers. DNA testing performed in 2001 revealed that neither
James nor Jean Morgan was Shirley Morgan's parent. James had "openly
and frequently asserted that Shirley was not his child."76 Shirley had a
darker complexion than her "siblings." She "was ostracized and terribly
mistreated by James Morgan and the Morgan siblings."n
Shirley searched for her biological mother and learned that one other
baby was born at the hospital. She contacted the other "switched baby,"
Debra, and Debra called her "mother," Shirley's biological mother, Polly,
and broke the news.
Shirley and Polly sued Banner Health Systems, which staffed and op-
erated Campbell County Memorial Hospital, for negligence in switching
the babies at birth. The claim was for emotional damages only. The hospi-
tal moved to dismiss the complaint, urging that Wyoming did not recog-
nize a cause of action for negligence resulting only in emotional injury.
73. It can be argued that Witt was wrongly decided. Though the anguish was foreseeable, the plaintiffs
must have known that the ART technique was experimental and fraught with risk. Here, the anguish arose
from the loss of chance of unproven, experimental therapy.
74. Larson, 81 P.3d at 196.
75. Id. at 198.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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The Wyoming Supreme Court recognized its jurisprudence in emo-
tional distress claims. "Wyoming has clearly restricted the instances in
which recovery for emotional injury without accompanying physical in-
jury will be allowed.""
The Court recognized that the baby switching completely severed the
parent-child relationship and that the Court had never addressed a similar
case. It looked to other reported cases involving baby switching" (which
will be discussed later in this article) but found them unhelpful as applied
to the Larsen facts.
The Wyoming Supreme Court approved the Iowa Supreme Court's
approach to negligence claims for emotional damages. That approach rec-
ognizes an "exception to the general rule prohibiting recovery for strictly
emotional damages"" "where the nature of the relationship between the
parties is such that there arises a duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid
causing emotional harm."" The Wyoming Supreme Court preferred
"Iowa's application of the independent duty exception because this expres-
sion is narrowly tailored and well-reasoned,"82 which "exists only in cir-
cumstances involving contractual services that carry with them deeply
emotional responses in the event of breach. There must be a close nexus
between the negligent action at issue and extremely emotional circum-
stances.""
The Court easily concluded that emotional distress is foreseeable
when baby switching is discovered.84 Of interest, the Court also concluded
that baby switching cases "present the direct victims of a tort"" and that
"the concerns related to the closeness of 'bystanders' are thus not pre-
sent."8 6 It is not at all clear whether the Court considers the switched ba-
bies, the parents, or both as direct victims of the hospital negligence.
The Court identified a genuine injury" and moral blame attaching to
the hospital's conduct." After applying the "balancing of factors test,"8 9
the Court stated:
78. Id at 199.
79. Id. at 202.
80. Id. at 202-03.
81. Id. at 202-03. (quoting Lawrence v. Grinde, 534 N.W. 2d 414, 421 (Iowa 1995)).
82. Id. at 203.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 204.
85. Id.
86. Id
87. Id.
88. Id. at 205.
89. Id. at 206.
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it is difficult for the court, on the basis of natural justice, to
reach the conclusion that this type of action will not lie. Human
tendencies and sympathies suggest otherwise [citations omitted].
Accordingly, we hold that in Wyoming, in the limited circum-
stances where a contractual relationship exists for services that
carry with them deeply emotional responses in the event of a
breach, there arises a duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid
causing emotional harm. However, as can be seen by our dis-
cussion, this exception is extremely limited. We persist in seek-
ing to assure that our already burdened court system will not be
additionally burdened by an overly broad liability for emotional
damages.90
Certainly, the time frame involved in Larsen was extreme and may
have influenced the Court's decision. Here, the parent-child relationship
was destroyed. Nevertheless, the Court did focus on the unique nature of
the baby switching NIED claim and did not believe that the recognition of
the claim would tax the court system.
C. Wishard Memorial Hospital v. Logwood"
Wishard2 involved baby switching of children born to hospital
roommates, but only for a period of hours. An emotional distress claim
was filed and the trial court denied the hospital's motion to dismiss. An in-
terlocutory appeal ensued and the Court of Appeals framed the issue as:
"Whether the negligent placing of a newborn infant in the hands of one not
its mother, for a period of hours, constitutes an impact to the infant and to
the parents necessary to support their action for emotional distress."'
After discussing the Indiana law pertaining to emotional distress
claims, the Court held that since there was no "contemporaneous physical
injury accompanying the emotional anguish,"94 there was simply no claim.
With no evidence of hospital willful or intentional conduct, the claims did
not fall within the Indiana exception to the contemporaneous physical in-
jury rule." Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court with directions to
enter summary judgment for the hospital.
90. Id. at 206-07. The Supreme Court of Wyoming recently confirmed the limited exception to recovery
for emotional damages "accompanied by physical injury, exposure to physical harm or willful, wanton or
malicious conduct" in Hendricks v. Hurley, 184 P.3d 680, 687 (Wyo. 2008).
91. Wishard Memorial Hosp. v. Logwood, 512 N.E.2d 1126 (Ind. 1987).
92. Id
93. Id at 1127.
94. Id
95. Id. at 1128.
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D. Twigg v. Hospital Dist. of Hardee County"
In Twigg, the Court considered a complaint filed in 1989 regarding an
alleged baby switch occurring at the defendant hospital in 1978.97 The
complaint alleged negligent infliction of emotional distress but no physical
injury. The court ruled that the hospital's "motion to dismiss will be
granted only insofar as Plaintiffs may be attempting to file a separate cause
of action for psychic trauma alone ."98 There was no discussion of the
nature of baby switching claims.
E. Espinosa v. Beverly Hospital"
Espinosa is an early case of baby switching with a claim of emotional
distress and no physical injury. Here, the plaintiffs took a switched baby
home and cared for the baby until the error was discovered. Plaintiffs ad-
vised the hospital and were given another child, presumably plaintiffs'
own child. Plaintiffs' claim was tried before a jury, which returned a ver-
dict for the hospital.
The Espinosa court explained that under California law at that time,
"the human body can through negligence of others suffer injury in only
two ways: (1) by physical impact, and (2) by shock, through the senses, to
the nervous system.""oo The court cautioned, however, that "it does not
necessarily follow that every mental disturbance is caused by a shock to
the nervous system."' The jury, under its instructions, had been author-
ized to award damages and "supplement them with damages for mental
suffering, anxiety and loss of sleep," 02 if "the delivery of the wrong baby
produced such an impact upon the nervous system of either appellant as to
cause physical injuries.."Io3 Insofar as there was no such physical injury,
there was no recovery for "mental suffering."'"
F. DeLeon Lopez v. Corporacion Insular de Segurosos
The court characterized this case as a "topsy-turvy tale of the traded
96. Twigg, 731 F. Supp. at 469; See Mays, 543 So. 2d at 241 regarding paternity issue.
97. Twigg, 731 F. Supp. at 470.
98. Id. at 472.
99. Espinosa, 249 P.2d at 843.
100. Id at 844.
101. Id
102. Id
103. Id
104. Id. at 845.
105. Lopez, 931 F.2d at 116.
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twins."' Identical twin daughters were born in 1985 in Puerto Rico. The
next day, fraternal twin daughters were born in the same facility. Babies
from each set of twins were switched. Ultimately, after approximately two
years, in 1987, the families, previously aware of the problem, returned the
twins - essentially an exchange to cause realignment.
An emotional distress claim was filed by the grandfather of one of the
switched babies against the hospital's malpractice insurer.'o The case went
to trial. The district court "ruled as a matter of law that the baby-switching,
if negligently occasioned, fell within the Hospital's medical malpractice
coverage."' The district court granted plaintiffs motion for directed ver-
dict on negligence, on a res ipsa loquitur'" theory. The jury returned an
$800,000 verdict for compensatory damages. This award was subsequently
the subject of a remittitur"o and judgment was entered on the reduced
damage award.
The Court of Appeals examined the application of res ipsa loquitur to
the claim. It held that the elements of res ipsa loquitur were met because:
1. "Common sense dictates that babies will not be switched
unless due care is by the boards,""' and "a swap could not have
eventuated in the absence of negligence."ll 2
2. Exclusivity of control was present as "the Hospital was solely
in charge of safekeeping and tending the infants in its care. It
dominated the environment, exercising pervasive control over
what transpired in the wards, in the nursery, and elsewhere on
the premises.""' Neither mother had access to the other's new-
borns.
3. Plaintiff' " was free of responsibility for the negligent act.
The Court of Appeals made an interesting observation as to the evi-
dence at trial. Plaintiff "suffered emotional trauma related both to his own
loss and to watching his son and daughter-in-law undergo so wrenching an
experience."'" "[N]o medical or other expert testimony was presented in
106. Id. at 119.
107. Id. A direct action was appropriate pursuant to Puerto Rico law. P.R. Laws Ann. Tit. 26, §§ 2002-
2004 (1976).
108. Id. at 120.
109. DOBBS, supra note 8, at 370.
110. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 595-96 (Thom-
son West 4h ed. 2005).
111. Lopez, 931 F.2d at 124.
112. Id
113. Id.
114. Id
115. Id. at 125.
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connection with the damage claim."ll 6 Plaintiff "contracted no lasting
physical or mental impairment."' 17 Yet the Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's judgment on the verdict, despite evidence that could never
withstand a Filson"' analysis due to the absence of expert testimony of
emotional disability, not to mention that plaintiff was not the parent of a
switched baby.
G. Ryan v. United States"'
Ryan concerned a claim of baby switching occurring at a hospital in
Fort Yates, North Dakota in 1946. The claim against the U.S. was not filed
until 2002. Damages were sought for emotional distress. The court de-
tailed the chronology of events from before 1973 to 2004, including DNA
testing, which confirmed the switch.
Not surprisingly, the U.S. moved to dismiss the claim on limitations
grounds. The motion was granted1 20 and the Court of Appeals affirmed.121
Neither the district court nor the Court of Appeals opinion discussed the
merits of the emotional distress claim.
VI. ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION
Filson,12 2 in a baby switching context, is an example of how a court
may become trapped in the unfortunate jurisprudence of a state. Baby-
switching must be a traumatic event for the parents, even if the hospital er-
ror is discovered and corrected in a relatively short period of time. It is
hard to imagine that baby switching would not implicate a breach of a
hospital's duty to care for the newborn, with some resultant emotional
harm suffered by the parents. Neither the traditional nor more modern ap-
proaches to NIED claims provide comfort to parents if they cannot over-
come a physical impact, zone of danger or emotional disability analysis.
Why not adopt an approach which looks to the quality and depth of emo-
tional distress as a measure of damages? The Filson analysis simply trivi-
116. Id.
117. Id. at 116. See also Lopez, 931 F.2d at 47 (noting that "the plaintiff presented no evidence of any eco-
nomic loss, neither past, present, nor future, due to the switching of the twins. There was no expert testi-
mony presented concerning plaintiffs past, present or future psychological damages. There was no evi-
dence of any temporary or permanent physical or mental impairment. The plaintiff did not give to the jury
any evidence of a loss of earnings or services. He presented no evidence of an inability to perform and
function and live his life in the future as he always had").
118. Id.
119. Ryan, 2007 WL at 557193.
120. Ryan, 2007 WL at *1.
121. Ryan v. U.S., 534 F.3d 828, 829 (8th Cir. 2008).
122. Filson, 2009 WL at 196048.
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alizes baby switching NIED claims by using a proof requirement - emo-
tional disability - which may dismantle the claim.
Another quite recent example of this "trapped by jurisprudence"
problem arises in Hedgepath v. Whitman Walker Clinic,123 an HIV misdi-
agnosis and NIED case. The issue here was "whether a patient may re-
cover damages for acute emotional distress resulting from a negligent mis-
diagnosis of Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV"), where the
misdiagnosis did not directly place the patient in physical danger."l24
In Hedgepath, following the diagnosis, there was true, medically
documented emotional distress. As the court noted, for a five year period,
plaintiff believed he was HIV positive, was depressed, had suicidal
thoughts, was twice committed to hospital psychiatric wards, and was pre-
scribed medications for depression. The misdiagnosis led to the use of il-
legal drugs, an eating disorder, family isolation and other complications.
NIED claims in the District of Columbia require a zone of danger presence
applicable to the plaintiff, including bystander plaintiffs. Since Hedgepath
was never exposed to HIV and was HIV negative, he was never in the
zone of danger and could not recover as a matter of law.'25
Hedgepath's problem was not the same as Ms. Filson's. Hedgepath
suffered an abundance of documented emotional distress but did not meet
the "zone of danger" test. Ms. Filson was unencumbered by the zone of
danger requirement but simply did not prove the existence of "emotional
disability" - frankly, a convenient conclusion drawn by a court with an
overriding concern for frivolous NIED lawsuits.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite the estimate of yearly accidental baby-switches to which the
introduction to this article referred, 12 it appears as if very few of the inci-
dents have seeped into the NIED jurisprudence. Baby switching NIED
claims are interesting and challenging, as the parents as plaintiffs do not
neatly fit into the NIED victim categories of direct and bystander. How-
ever, the anguish of parents is undeniable in situations similar to Filsonl27
or when leaving a hospital with another's child, as is the breach of the
hospital's duty of care that allowed the switch to occur. There does not
123. Hedgepath v. Whitman Walker Clinic, No. 07-CV-158 (D. Dec. Oct. 1, 2009), available at
http://www.dcappeals.gov/dccourts/appeals/pdf/07-CV-158_MTD.PDF.
124. Id. at 1-2.
125. Id. at 2.
126. Rusting, supra note 1, at 89.
127. Filson, 2009 WL at 196048.
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seem to be a flood of spurious, non-meritorious baby switching NIED
claims. The potential universe of claims is likely limited. The jurispru-
dence of any jurisdiction should be able to recognize the sui generis nature
of the NIED baby switching claim and provide realistic court access and
opportunity for proof"'2 8
128. For example, the Supreme Court of Illinois recently held "that expert testimony, while it may assist
the jury, is not required to support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress." Thornton v. Gar-
cini, 2009 WL 3471065, *4 (Ill. 2009). The admissibility of lay testimony would likely assist greatly in
overcoming the burden of the Filson analysis. If a trial court cannot dismiss a NIED claim for want of ex-
pert testimony, it would be hard pressed to determine as a matter of law that a plaintiff has not suffered suf-
ficient emotional distress.
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